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Several events occurred in the last week that highlight the psychology of how people perceive and then 
act on right and wrong. First, Alger Hiss died. Up to the last, the ex-staff officer with the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, Congressional committees, the Justice Department, and State Department, 
the Secretary General of the 1945 San Francisco conference at which the United Nations charter was 
ratified, and the ex-president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was still professing 
innocence, still denying any linkage with Communist espionage activities. Also in the last week, the 
review of the decision to bar Richard Nuccio, a current State Department official, from access to 
classified information continues. The review was directed by the Director of Central Intelligence, John 
Deutsch. At issue is Nuccio's providing classified information to a member of the House Select 
Committee on Intelligence. The information suggested that members of the Central Intelligence Agency 
were withholding information that one of their Guatemalan agents might have been involved-- directly 
or indirectly-- in the murders of one U.S. citizen and the husband of another or in the cover-up of 
complicity for these murders.. On a different order of magnitude, although still with personnel security 
and counterintelligence import, military commissioned and noncommissioned officers continue to be 
accused, investigated, prosecuted, and, in some cases, convicted of sexual harassment, engaging in 
inappropriate personal relations, and even rape of sexual subordinates.  
 
Most recently, Harold Nicholson has been identified as a 16-year Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) GS-15 
officer, a former station chief in Romania, deputy station chief in Malaysia, and section chief at the CIA 
counterterrorism center, who allegedly received $120K from the SVRR, the Russian Federation Foreign 
Intelligence Service, successor to the KGB, in return for divulging classified information. Apparently the 
damage assessment is still ongoing, but Nicholson probably divulged (1) identities, backgrounds, and 
missions of future U.S. undercover agents, (2) U.S. intelligence operations methods in Romania, 
Malaysia, Japan, and the Philippines, and (3) U.S. intelligence data and analysis on issues of interest to 
the Russian government. If the allegations are true, Nicholson is the first CIA station chief ever to be 
publicly acknowledged as committing espionage against the U.S. Government.  
 
This was the week that was and it brings up yet again the dilemma for directors, chiefs, supervisors, and 
co-workers involved in the obtaining and protecting, of sensitive information: how to ensure that people 
follow the rules--be this behavioral compliance, identification, or internalization. One psychological 
research tradition relevant to this dilemma is that of moral judgment levels. Of special note is the work 
of the late social psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg.  
 
Kohlberg posited five levels of moral judgment. He theorized and marshaled significant cross-cultural 
data to support the notion that people transited at least some of these levels during their life course. 
Some made it all the way to level 5, some remained at level 1. At level 1, people follow the rules to avoid 
punishment. Or they obey for the very sake of obedience or to avoid physical damage to persons or 
property. At level 2, they follow the rules only when it is in their own immediate interest or in the 
interest of an ally, or if it seems to be an equal exchange-- a fair deal or agreement. At level 3, they obey 
the rules because it is generally expected of people, because it is instrumental in maintaining desired 
relationships. At level 4, they follow the rules because they have agreed to do so and because obedience 
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is viewed as a contribution to society, a group, or organization. Or as a social contract. Finally at level 5, 
they follow the rules for reasons similar to those at level 4, but they withhold the right to violate these 
rules because certain values, e.g., life and liberty, must be upheld as a higher goal.  
 
The implications for personnel security and counterintelligence experts are many. For example, the 
different people in an organization will do right or violate what's right for both similar and different 
reasons. One takes different routes to exploit individuals or to reinforce their virtue. And people at least 
have the probability of changing with time. What keeps them in line at one point may not at another. 
And although level 5 was viewed as the most morally advanced by Kohlberg, personnel security 
managers might prefer their charges to remain no higher than level 4. To the managers, level- 5 people 
may appear too much like loose cannons, like the antithesis of team players, even if the values they seek 
to uphold to the detriment of the organization's rules are the very ones allegedly esteemed by that 
organization.  
 
The biggest problem, however, is how one creates and manages a personnel security system which must 
simultaneously handle so many different kinds of people. The likelihood is that what keeps one type of 
person in line may increase the probability that another type strays off the path. A case in point is 
increasing the penalties for espionage. Certainly, this increase is more likely to keep a level-1 person 
obeying the rules. However, it might make the option of a rules transgression more necessary for a 
level-5 person who views behavioral freedom as the essence of liberty and the increased penalties as a 
call to glory.  
 
Kohlberg's research on moral judgment certainly can generate hypotheses and new perspectives on 
maximizing the probability that people obey the rules. There will still be motives untouched. And it is 
important to note that even the right moral judgment may not elicit or lead to the right behavior. 
Sometimes, in fact often, according to Kohlberg and many other social psychologists, there are 
disconnects. Another body of psychological research on the consistency among attitudes, belief systems, 
and behavior can shed light on this.  
 
There is personal and professional import here. For who knows what was going on in Kohlberg's own 
deliberations of right and wrong when he decided to kill himself, and then acted on it? Was this right 
behavior impelled by a judgment that such behavior was right? Or did Kohlberg know it was wrong, but 
went ahead anyway, much as many people involved in espionage have done? Was this his and their own 
mode of figuratively killing the self, their country, of merging from chrysalis to butterfly. Or like Lucifer, 
did a sense of entitlement doom them to fall from Grace? (See Author. Joint press release of the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the Central Intelligence Agency. An employee of the Central Intelligence 
Agency was arrested November 16 for spying on behalf of Russia. (http://www.fbi.gov/ 
ciaspy/ciaspy.htm;) Kohlberg, L. (1984.) The psychology of moral development: The nature and validity 
of moral stages. (1st ed.) San Francisco: Harper & Row.) (Keywords: Espionage; Moral development.) 
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